Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance
在一个世代交叠模型中，研究前瞻指引沟通的松紧如何影响市场信息依赖，进而放大价格冲击、降低预测能力并损害社会福利，但适当政策可化险为夷。
This paper studies the social value of information about the future. In a stylized OLG model, agents need to forecast the future price level, they observe the current price and perceive with idiosyncratic noise the expectation announced by a more informed authority. When forward guidance communication is loose, the market becomes a main source of information about the future. Reliance on market information amplifies the impact of shocks on prices, which increases ex ante uncertainty and worsens agents' forecasting ability, harming social welfare. However, an appropriate policy can convert the perils of the announcement in opportunities.