Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
利用匹配企业-工人的面板数据发现，CEO控制权越强，工人薪酬越高，但现金流权所有权能抑制这一行为；固守职位的CEO更倾向于给层级近、地理近或工会冲突倾向强的员工加薪，以换取低努力谈判等私人利益。
ABSTRACT Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker‐level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict‐inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.