CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies
研究发现持有私人飞行员执照的CEO（作为个人风险承担的代理变量）所在企业风险更高，表现为更高的股权回报波动性，且这种风险源于杠杆和收购活动等具体企业政策。
Abstract This study analyzes the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking, and total firm risk. We find evidence that CEOs who possess private pilot licenses (our proxy for personal risk-taking) are associated with riskier firms. Firms led by pilot CEOs have higher equity return volatility, beyond the amount explained by compensation components that financially reward risk-taking. We trace the source of the elevated firm risk to specific corporate policies, including leverage and acquisition activity. Our results suggest that nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the scope of the firm have implications for project selection and various corporate policies.