财政积极主义与名义利率零下限

Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2017
被引 16
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究了名义利率触及零下限时,任命一位比私人部门更不关心政府支出稳定、更关注通胀和产出缺口稳定的政策制定者,能通过预期未来财政扩张来提升通胀预期、降低实际利率,从而缓解经济下滑。

Abstract

In an economy where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is an occasionally binding constraint and the government lacks a commitment technology, it may be desirable for society to appoint a policymaker who cares less about government spending stabilization relative to inflation and output gap stabilization than the private sector does. A policymaker of this type uses government spending more elastically to stabilize the economy. At the zero lower bound, the anticipation of aggressive fiscal expansions in future liquidity trap situations increases inflation expectations and lowers real interest rates, thereby mitigating the decline in output and inflation.

零利率下限财政激进主义政府支出弹性通胀预期