Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending
研究发现，政治知识不足导致穷人投票失误，削弱其政治影响力，使政党政策更偏向富人；美国选举数据证实，收入对知情选民的影响更大，且当收入与信息高度相关时，国会代表投票更保守。
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behaviour for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.