Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
用一个替代假设的例子，说明在金融市场中，当更多交易者获取信息时，价格不一定变得更有效，交易者反而可能更有动力去获取信息，学习成为战略互补，可能导致多重均衡。
Previous work on information and financial markets has focused on a special set of assumptions: agents have exponential utility, and random variables are normally distributed. These assumptions are often necessary to obtain closed-form solutions. We present an example with alternative assumptions, and demonstrate that some of the conclusions from previous literature fail to hold. In particular, we show that in our example, as more agents acquire information, prices do not necessarily become more informative, and agents may have greater incentive to acquire information. Learning can therefore be a strategic complement, allowing for the possibility of multiple equilibria.