Admissibility in Games
研究在博弈中，若每个玩家都是理性的且认为他人理性，同时理性包含避免弱占优策略（可容许性），那么哪些策略能被采用。作者提出“理性与m阶理性假设”和“理性与共同理性假设”的认知框架，并给出相应解概念。
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement–i.e., the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of “rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality ” (RmAR) and “rationality and common assumption of rationality ” (RCAR). We show: (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept called a “self-admissible set; ” (ii) in a “complete ” type structure, RmAR is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m + 1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies; (iii) under a non-triviality condition, RCAR is impossible in a complete structure.