Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
研究两人利益冲突重复博弈，若玩家一有正概率是承诺型（始终玩其最有利策略），则在其贴现因子接近1时，任何纳什均衡中玩家一至少获得其承诺收益。该结果与不完全信息民间定理形成鲜明对比。
A two-person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a commitme nt type who will always play this strategy. Then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one. This result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the Folk theorem for games with incomplete information. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.