Make Versus Buy in Trucking:Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information
研究1987至1997年间车载计算机的采用如何影响卡车运输中自营与外包的选择，发现不同功能分别推动自营或外包，揭示了资产所有权模式受不完全合同、工作设计与测量问题共同影响。
Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that OBCs' incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but their resource-allocation-improving features pushed them toward for-hire carriage. We conclude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance of both incomplete contracts and of job design and measurement issues.