Auditor Resignation and Firm Ownership Structure
研究了家族企业与非家族企业中审计师辞职的可能性及市场反应差异，发现家族企业审计师辞职更少，且市场反应更积极，尤其当CEO为创始人或非家族成员时。
SYNOPSIS This paper investigates whether the likelihood of auditor resignations and the associated stock market reaction in family firms is significantly different from that in non-family firms. It also examines whether the aforementioned associations vary with the identity of the CEO managing family firms (founder, descendant, or non-family CEO). Relying on a sample of auditor resignations in the U.S. over five calendar years, 2004–2008, and using two control samples (matched and random) as benchmarks, we document the following. First, the likelihood of auditor resignations in family firms is significantly lower than that in non-family firms. Second, auditor resignations in family firms managed by a founder or non-family CEO (descendant) are also less (more) frequent compared to non-family firms. Finally, abnormal returns following auditor resignations in family firms and in family firms managed by a non-family CEO are higher (less negative) than those in non-family firms. These results are robust to the selection bias resulting from family ownership and contribute to the literature investigating auditor portfolio management decisions. Data Availability: All data are from publicly available sources.