Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates
研究发现，当人们的技能和贴现率不同时，对高收入者征收储蓄税或对低收入者提供储蓄补贴能提高社会福利，结果取决于能力与贴现率的相关性。
With heterogeneity in both skills and discount factors, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem that savings should not be taxed does not hold. In a model with heterogeneity of preferences at each earnings level, introducing a savings tax on high earners or a savings subsidy on low earners increases welfare, regardless of the correlation between ability and discount factor. Extending Emmanuel Saez (2002), a uniform savings tax increases welfare if that correlation is sufficiently high. Key for the results is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted by a lower paid job. Some optimal tax results and empirical evidence are presented.