Agency Conflicts in Closed-End Funds: The Case of Rights Offerings
研究1988-1998年间120次封闭式基金配股发行，发现公告时溢价随后转为折价，且折价程度与投资顾问薪酬增加及使用关联经纪商相关，表明存在显著利益冲突。
We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988-1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's compensation are larger and when the fund uses affiliated brokerdealers to solicit subscriptions to the offer. A clinical analysis shows that rights offerings allow investment advisors to sidestep fee rebates and increase pecuniary benefits to affiliated entities. Overall, our results suggest the presence of significant conflicts of interest in rights offerings by closed-end funds.