Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross‐Border Banking Mergers within the EU
研究检验了欧盟各国银行安全网福利差异如何影响跨境并购活动，发现监管套利动机显著，对央行评估监管差异后果有参考价值。
Expanding the cross‐country footprint of an organization's profit‐making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that differences in the size and character of safety‐net benefits available to banks in individual EU countries help to account for cross‐border merger activity. Our results suggest that central bankers need to develop statistical procedures for assessing the consequences of differences in supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries. We believe that the methods used here can help in this task.