Please Don't Vote for Me: Voting in a Natural Experiment with Perverse Incentives
利用德国选举制度中一个政党得票越少反而可能获得更多席位的制度缺陷，研究了2005年德国联邦议院选举中一个选区的补选，发现大量选民因反常激励而策略性投票或弃权。
Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this article documents patterns of preference misrepresentation in a large, real‐world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right‐wing candidate necessitated a by‐election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and given the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained.