The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
利用银行月度证券持有数据，发现欧洲主权债务危机期间，财政压力大的国家中，国内银行在政府需大量展期到期债务时更可能增持本国主权债券，且受政府支持、规模小或资产负债表弱的银行尤其易受道德劝诱影响。
Using proprietary data on banks’ monthly securities holdings, we show that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during months when the government needed to roll over a relatively large amount of maturing debt. This result cannot be explained by risk shifting, carry trading, or regulatory compliance. Domestic banks that received government support, are small, or with weaker balance sheets were particularly susceptible to “moral suasion,” while governance of banks played less of a role..