Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
通过实验发现，筛选工作态度和劳动力市场竞争是高绩效工作系统可行的关键因素，并揭示了自主权、利润分享与筛选之间的互补性如何催生好工作与坏工作的分化。
High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: “bad” jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and “good” jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination.