Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data
研究发现，有采购收入的企业在地方选举期间会增加隧道挖掘行为，表明现金被输送给政客以换取采购合同；在更腐败的地区，采购合同流向低生产率企业，否定了“高效润滑”假说。
We provide evidence of corruption in allocation of public procurement and assess its efficiency. Firms with procurement revenue increase tunneling around regional elections, whereas neither tunneling of firms without procurement revenue, nor legitimate business of firms with procurement exhibits a political cycle. Data are consistent with the corruption channel—cash is tunneled to politicians in exchange for procurement contracts—and inconsistent with alternative channels. Using the strength of correlation between procurement revenue and tunneling around elections as a proxy for local corruption, we reject the “efficient grease” hypothesis: in more corrupt localities, procurement contracts go to unproductive firms.