Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations
研究美国证券交易委员会一项旨在便利股东提名董事的规则提案的财富效应，发现提案通过概率上升时公司股价显著下跌，表明股东赋权未必创造价值。
Abstract Current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment benefits shareholders. We investigate the wealth effects associated with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. Our results are not in line with shareholder empowerment creating value: The average daily abnormal returns surrounding events that increase (decrease) the probability of the proposal’s passage are significantly negative (positive). Furthermore, given an increase in the probability of the proposal’s passage, firms whose shareholders are more likely to use the rule to nominate directors experience more negative abnormal returns.