The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets
提出了一个图形理论框架，同时分析保险市场中消费者在是否购买和购买哪种计划两个维度上的选择，并利用马萨诸塞州数据展示了政策在其中一个维度上的调整如何影响另一个维度的价格、参保率和福利。
Abstract Insurance markets often feature consumer sorting along both an extensive margin (whether to buy) and an intensive margin (which plan to buy). We present a new graphical theoretical framework that extends a workhorse model to incorporate both selection margins simultaneously. A key insight from our framework is that policies aimed at addressing one margin of selection often involve an economically meaningful trade-off on the other margin in terms of prices, enrollment, and welfare. Using data from Massachusetts, we illustrate these trade-offs in an empirical sufficient statistics approach that is tightly linked to the graphical framework we develop.