Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: A Historical Analysis
通过一个工人偷懒、监控成本高且男女离职率不同的模型，解释了1900年左右美国制造业中女性更可能按件计酬、男女很少在同一公司同一职业的现象，并利用企业层面数据检验了计时与计件岗位的性别差异。
Female manufacturing workers around 1900 were far more likely to be paid by the piece and were rarely employed at the same occupation in the same firm as males. These and related aspects of work organization can be understood through a model in which workers shirk, monitoring is costly, and males and females have different turnover rates. Employers adopt either piece rates or deferred payment. Occupational segregation by sex and differences in earnings result even if workers are equally productive. Establishment-level data on supervising male and female workers in time- and piece-rate positions are examined.