薪酬与激励:实践与理论

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

Journal of Finance · 1988
被引 1730 · 同刊同年前 2%
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

指出传统经济理论难以解释企业常见的激励实践(如平均主义薪酬、晋升激励、不轻易解雇等),并挑战经济学家为这些现象提供合理的经济解释或整合行为学概念。

Abstract

ABSTRACT A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory—including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion‐based incentive systems, the absence of up‐front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic—focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.

激励结构薪酬体系晋升激励组织行为