Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance
研究发现州级腐败和政治关联显著影响市政债券的销售与承销：腐败程度越高，债券信用风险越大、收益率越高；腐败州可通过购买信用增强来消除收益率惩罚；承销商的政治捐款导致承销费用上升，且仅存在于可基于政治偏袒分配业务的谈判竞价债券中。
We show that state corruption and political connections have strong effects on municipal bond sales and underwriting. Higher state corruption is associated with greater credit risk and higher bond yields. Corrupt states can eliminate the corruption yield penalty by purchasing credit enhancements. Underwriting fees were significantly higher during an era when underwriters made political contributions to win underwriting business. This pay-to-play underwriting fee premium exists only for negotiated bid bonds where underwriting business can be allocated on the basis of political favoritism. Overall, our results show a strong impact of corruption and political connections on financial market outcomes.