Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
研究了拥有过剩流动性的银行在向需要流动性的银行放贷时拥有市场势力，导致贷款配给和资产购买的低效率，而中央银行作为最后贷款人可以缓解这种低效率。
We study interbank lending and asset sales markets in which banks with surplus liquidity have market power vis-à-vis banks needing liquidity, frictions arise in lending due to moral hazard, and assets are bank-specific. Surplus banks ration lending and instead purchase assets from needy banks, an inefficiency more acute during financial crises. A central bank acting as a lender-of-last-resort can ameliorate this inefficiency provided it is prepared to extend potentially loss-making loans or is better informed than outside markets, as might be the case if it also performs a supervisory role. This rationale for central banking finds support in historical episodes.