Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
分析民事诉讼中法院决策的法律原则和程序，旨在证据不完美且可能被当事人扭曲时，激励潜在侵权人谨慎行事。研究发现，优势证据标准与普通法排除规则相结合可实现效率，但可能产生无效均衡，此时举证责任指南可作为协调工具；若法院扮演更积极的纠问角色，则指南可能不必要。
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator.