The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem
研究发行方如何设计合同，激励投资银行在注册期通过预售活动获取私人信息，同时防止银行为了减少销售努力而故意压低发行价，并证明将定价权委托给银行可能是最优的。
In placing a new security issue, an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain private information by conducting preselling activities during the registration period. The task of the issuer is to design a contract that both induces the banker to use this information to the issuer's advantage and provides a disincentive for the banker to price the issue too low in order to reduce the effort required to sell the issue. This paper characterizes the class of price response functions that the issuer can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrates that delegating the pricing decision to the banker can be optimal.