Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
研究公司董事的外部任职数量，发现董事任职更多与公司规模、董事会规模及企业绩效正相关，但未发现多重任职导致失职或增加证券欺诈诉讼风险的证据，不支持限制董事任职数量的主张。
Abstract We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.