Insurance and Perceptions: How to Screen Optimists and Pessimists
研究了人们不同的风险感知如何影响保险公司提供的合同，分析了风险感知对支付意愿和风险降低努力的影响，揭示了风险与保险覆盖之间的相关性，并讨论了政府干预的必要性。
People have very different beliefs about the risks they face. I analyze how heterogeneous risk perceptions affect the insurance contracts offered by pro.t-maximizing .rms. An essential distinction is how risk perceptions affect the willingness to pay for insurance relative to the willingness to exert risk-reducing effort. This determines both the sign of the correlation between risk and insurance coverage in equilibrium, shedding new light on a recent empirical puzzle, and the type of individuals screened by either monopolistic or competing .rms. Even with perfect competition, heterogeneous risk perceptions may well strengthen the case for government intervention in insurance markets.