The Limits of Price Discrimination
分析了垄断者利用额外消费者信息进行三级价格歧视的福利后果，发现这种定价策略能实现消费者剩余和生产者剩余的多种组合，但总剩余不超过有效交易产生的剩余。
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out “third degree price discrimination.” We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer sur plus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade.