How Sticky Wages in Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring
构建了一个匹配模型，其中新雇员的工资灵活，但现有工作中的工资粘性。研究发现，当现有工人工资过高时，企业会要求更多努力，降低额外劳动力的价值，从而减少招聘。
We consider a matching model of employment with flexible wages for new hires but sticky wages within matches. Unlike most models of sticky wages, we allow effort to respond if wages are too high or too low. In the Mortensen-Pissarides model, employment is not affected by wage stickiness in existing matches. But it is in our model. If wages of matched workers are stuck too high, firms require more effort, lowering the value of additional labor and reducing hiring. We find that effort’s response can greatly increase wage inertia.