Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk‐Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects
构建动态模型，研究风险厌恶的经理在杠杆公司中如何做出投资决策，分析新项目改变公司风险时决策扭曲的程度，并考察杠杆、债务期限、项目规模、经理风险厌恶等因素的影响。
We create a dynamic model in which a self‐interested, risk‐averse manager makes corporate investment decisions at a levered firm with characteristics typical of public US firms. We examine the magnitude of distortions in those decisions when a new project changes firm risk and find expected changes in the values of future tax shields and bankruptcy costs to be important factors. We evaluate the extent to which these distortions vary with firm leverage, debt duration, project size, managerial risk aversion, managerial non‐firm wealth, and the structure of management compensation packages