CEO Pay Contracts and IFRS Reconciliations
研究了英国CEO是否利用英国公认会计原则向国际财务报告准则调整过程中的自由裁量权进行盈余管理，以及这种盈余管理与薪酬合同结构的关系。
We examine whether UK managers exploit the discretion provided in the UK GAAP to IFRS reconciliation process to manage earnings and whether this earnings management is associated with the structure of the managers' compensation contracts. We use a comprehensive data set of mainly hand-collected information from the firms' annual reports to provide evidence that, given the existence of an accounting-related vesting target in their pay schemes, CEOs use UK GAAP to IFRS reconciliations as an earnings management tool. We test our hypotheses under a number of different specifications, including a propensity score matching analysis. Our study contributes to the literature on the relation between earnings management and contractual incentives by focusing on a major structural change in accounting policies. © 2014 © 2014 European Accounting Association.