The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior
研究了共同基金家族在代理投票中如何选择“发声”（投票反对管理层）或“退出”（卖出股票），发现两者都是重要的治理机制，尤其当机构股东服务公司建议反对管理层时。
Abstract This paper examines mutual fund families’ proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence that both exit and voice are important governance mechanisms when Institutional Shareholder Services recommends voting against management. Funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater insider ownership.