Conundrums of the representative agent
探讨了当代宏观经济学（特别是DSGE）和微观经济学（特别是显示偏好理论）中效用最大化代表性代理人使用增加的现象，并分析了二十世纪中期经济学家抵制使用单一代表性代理人的原因以及后来促使其兴起的理论发展。
This paper examines the increased use of the utility-maximizing representative agent in both contemporary macroeconomics (DSGE in particular) and microeconomics (revealed preference theory in particular). It is argued that the economists who developed Walrasian general equilibrium theory and revealed preference theory during the middle of the twentieth century were aware that the use of a single representative agent would simplify their analysis, but sill resisted employing it. The paper discusses a number of developments—both within economic theory and more broadly—that accommodated the rise of the representative agent in more recent economic theory.