主权-银行恶性循环与ESBies

The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies

American Economic Review · 2016
被引 301 · 同刊同年前 8%
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

建立了一个主权-银行恶性循环的简化模型,发现限制银行国内主权风险暴露、持有高级别国内主权债务或国际分散化主权组合的高级部分(如欧元区的ESBies)可打破该循环,且ESBies能创造更多安全资产。

Abstract

We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio--known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.

主权-银行恶性循环ESBies银行主权风险敞口资产证券化