STANDARD‐SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY*
通过一个专利许可后产品市场竞争的简单模型，研究了标准制定组织相关的竞争政策问题，认为竞争政策不应偏向实施专利的持有者，不应要求标准制定前进行拍卖，也不应允许集体谈判专利费率。
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product‐market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard‐setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent‐holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent‐holders before standards are set in order to determine post‐standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.