Inferring market power under the threat of entry: the case of the Brazilian cement industry
研究了进口威胁而非实际进口如何抑制国内寡头定价，发现忽略进入威胁会低估市场势力，并以巴西水泥市场为例，说明即使进口极少，进口威胁仍显著影响国内价格。
Consider a setting where threatened rather than actual import competition restrains a domestic oligopoly's prices. I show that not modelling the entry threat may underestimate the true degree of market power, as incumbents' blunted price responses to demand shocks resemble perfectly competitive behavior. Evidence from Brazilian cement markets points to an important role for imports in determining domestic cement prices, despite the near absence of imports. On assuming autarky, models with market power are rejected in favor of competition among incumbents. However, allowing a role for imports rejects the autarky assumption and precludes one from rejecting the presence of market power.