DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE
研究在选民不确定候选人特质且广告可能欺骗时，选民如何投票；发现即使欺骗概率很小，选民也更可能选出低质量候选人。
We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions.