Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates: Empirical Evidence
研究上游制造商向下游零售商支付返利以达成销量目标的双重效应：既可能缓解零售商道德风险，也可能导致零售商放弃竞争产品。通过实地实验和模型估计，发现该返利旨在排挤竞争对手且未能最大化社会福利。
In many industries, upstream manufacturers pay downstream retailers for achieving quantity or market share targets. These “vertical rebates” may mitigate downstream moral hazard by inducing greater retail effort but may also incentivize retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting effects empirically for a rebate paid to one retailer. Using a field experiment, we exogenously vary the outcome of retailer effort. We estimate models of consumer choice and retailer behavior to quantify the rebate’s effect on retail assortment and effort. We find that the rebate is designed to exclude a competing product and fails to maximize social surplus.