What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals
基于2001-2002年美国联邦地区法官的数据，研究发现法官会调整意见撰写策略，在最小化工作量的同时最大化声誉和晋升机会，且上诉法院的政治构成会影响其行为。
Evidence from a data set of federal district judges from 2001 and 2002 suggests that district judges adjust their opinion-writing practices to minimize their workload while maximizing their reputation and chance for elevation to a higher court. District judges in circuits with politically uniform circuit judges are better able to predict what opinions will get affirmed by the circuit court, leading to higher publication rates and a higher affirmance rate. In contrast, district judges in circuits with politically diverse circuit judges are less able to predict the preferences of the reviewing circuit court panel, leading district judges to publish fewer but higher-quality opinions in an effort to maximize their affirmance rate.