Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies
研究了投资者视野长短如何影响企业行为，发现长期投资者持股比例高时，企业被低估时投资和股权融资更多、股东支付更少，这源于企业迎合短期投资者而非长期投资者。
Abstract We study the effect of investor horizons on corporate behavior. We argue that longer investor horizons attenuate the effect of stock mispricing on corporate policies. Consistent with our argument, we find that when a firm is undervalued, greater long-term investor ownership is associated with more investment, more equity financing, and less payouts to shareholders. Our results do not appear to be explained by long-term investor self-selection, monitoring (corporate governance), or concentration (blockholdings). Our results are consistent with a version of market timing in which mispriced firms cater to the tastes of their short-term investors rather than their long-term investors.