Securitization and Lending Competition
研究了银行在拥有本地借款人还款概率私人信号时，证券化如何影响银行间贷款竞争。证券化导致银行也向远程但可观测特征强的借款人放贷，以减轻出售证券时的柠檬问题，但这会提高平均违约风险并可能虚假提升信用评分。
We study the effects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants' repayment chances. If banks cannot securitize, the outcome is efficient: they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants. With securitization, banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their securities. This reliance on observables is inefficient, raises the mean default risk, and may lead to a deceptive rise in credit scores.