All‐units discounts as a partial foreclosure device
研究主导企业使用全单位折扣（AUDs）在竞争对手产能受限时的策略效果，发现AUDs能通过捆绑需求部分排挤小竞争对手，降低买方剩余。
Abstract We investigate the strategic effects of all‐units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity‐constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use AUDs to go beyond its captive portion by tying its captive demand with part of the competitive demand and partially foreclose its small rival. When the rival's capacity level is well below relevant demand, AUDs reduce the buyer's surplus.