Contract renegotiation and options in agency problems
研究了当代理人投资于对委托人价值更高的资产时，双方能否通过合同重新谈判实现最优结果，发现期权合同在特定条件下可达成最优。
This article discusses the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever his threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.