Trade protection and bureaucratic corruption: an empirical investigation
研究发现，实行保护主义贸易政策的国家官僚腐败程度显著更高，且结果在考虑内生性后依然稳健，表明贸易自由化可能改善治理。
Abstract We examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Next, a panel‐data‐based GMM methodology is used to estimate a dynamic model of corruption. This estimator controls for country‐specific effects, potential endogeneity of trade policy, and existence of measurement errors afflicting the corruption data. The paper strengthens the case for trade liberalization and argues that trade reforms may lead to improvements in governance.