Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence*
检验了薪酬委员会独立性对CEO薪酬的影响，利用1996-2008年FTSE350公司数据，未发现CEO薪酬与董事独立性之间存在关系，挑战了管理层权力理论和机构指导的普遍看法。
Abstract This article tests the impact of remuneration committee independence on Chief Executive (CEO) pay. FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are used to assess whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal contracting or whether CEOs capture the pay‐setting process and inflate their own remuneration. This panel has a number of advantages over prior samples and, in particular, contains a more comprehensive assessment of non‐executive directors’ independence. No evidence of a relationship between CEO pay and director independence is found, challenging the theory of managerial power and the received wisdom of institutional guidance.