Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks
利用一家遭遇挤兑银行的独特存款人数据，研究发现未受保存款人最易挤兑，存款保险仅部分有效，银行与存款人的关系及社会网络能缓解挤兑，且挤兑后存款人不会回归。
We use unique depositor-level data for a bank that faced a run to understand the factors that affect depositor behavior. We find uninsured depositors are most likely to run. Deposit insurance helps, but is only partially effective. Bank-depositor relationships mitigate runs, suggesting that relationship with depositors help banks reduce fragility. In addition, we also find that social networks matter. Finally, we find long-term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank. Our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications.