Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance
研究发现对冲基金经理投入个人资本（内部投资）的基金业绩优于同一家族的其他基金，但经理人可能利用内部投资限制外部资本进入，从而损害外部投资者利益。
Hedge fund managers contribute substantial personal capital, or “skin in the game,” into their funds. Although these allocations may better align incentives, managers may also strategically allocate their private capital in ways that negatively affect outside investors. We find that funds with more inside investment outperform other funds within the same family. This relationship is driven by managerial decisions to invest their own capital in their least-scalable strategies and restrict the entry of new outsider capital into these funds. Our results suggest that insider capital may work as a rent-extraction mechanism at the expense of fund participation of outside investors. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: This work was supported by Columbia University and the Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.4984 .