Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms
研究风险投资家在其投资组合中的私营企业董事会中的代表情况，发现CEO更替时风险投资家的董事会席位增加，且距离企业远近影响其董事会成员身份。
This article examines the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of private firms in their portfolios. If venture capitalists are intensive monitors of managers, their involvement as directors should be more intense when the need for oversight is greater. I show that venture capitalists' representation on the board increases around the time of chief executive officer turnover, while the number of other outsiders remains constant. I also show that distance to the firm is an important determinant of the board membership of venture capitalists, as might be anticipated if the oversight of local firms is less costly than more distant businesses.