The Impact of Federal Overtime Legislation on Public Sector Labor Markets
通过计量和案例研究，分析1985年美国最高法院裁决使80%州和地方政府员工有权获得加班费后的劳动力市场效应，发现公共部门员工行为符合科斯模型，加班条款由双方协商，立法对加班时长影响有限。
In this article, I provide both econometric and case study evidence on the labor market effects of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1985 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority decision that made 80% of state and local government workers eligible to receive compensation for overtime hours worked. Empirical evidence suggests that the behavior of public sector workers is consistent with a Coasian model in which overtime provisions are explicitly bargained for by the parties involved, likely making overtime legislation an ineffective tool for influencing the amount of overtime hours worked by public sector employees.