Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital
研究发现CEO薪酬占比（CPS）与股权隐含资本成本正相关，且这种关系在自由现金流代理问题严重或CEO继任规划重要时更强，表明高CPS与CEO壕沟效应和高继任风险相关。
Abstract Executive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment and high succession risk.